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1
1 Introduction
The Easterlin Paradox is the name for the phenomenon that economic growth does not necessarily
increase happiness or life satisfaction in a variety of economies. This phenomenon challenges the
traditional views of economics that individuals’ utilities depend solely on their own consumption
of goods and that measures of income are sufficient indices to capture well-being.1 The Kingdom
of Bhutan has even adopted the national happiness product (GHP) rather than the gross domestic
product (GDP) to measure her national progress. Over the past decades, economists and psy-
chologists have exerted extensive efforts to explore the puzzling relationship between income and
happiness.
Two prominent approaches to explain the Easterlin Paradox are the “omitted variables” ap-
proach and the social comparison approach. Di Tella and MacCulloch (2005) coined the term
“omitted variables” to stand for non-income factors which have been shown in numerous experi-
mental and empirical studies to be strongly related to happiness.2 These non-income factors refer
to personal characteristics (health, friendship, religion, marriage), macroeconomic variables (infla-
tion, unemployment, inequality) and social variables (environment, human rights, trust, culture,
governance). According to the “omitted variables” approach, it is the depreciation of non-income
factors that accounts for the stagnation of happiness levels.
The social comparison approach, proposed first by Easterlin himself (1995, 2001), focuses on
the income factor only and states that happiness varies directly with one’s own income but varies
inversely with the incomes of others. When the positive effect of a person’s own higher income
is offset by the negative effect of others’ higher incomes, economic growth will not increase their
happiness, even though it increases their wealth. Although social comparison is a social-psychology
concept, it has been well modeled as interdependent preference in economics. For example, the
“keeping up with the Joneses” models, a growing literature in macroeconomics, rely on status-
seeking behaviors to study asset prices (e.g., Campbell and Cochrane, 1999), taxation and growth
(e.g., Liu and Turnovsky 2005).
Significant as they are, both approaches have limitations. The studies adopting the “omitted
variables” approach are mostly empirical or experimental analysis conducted by psychologists. Very
1Tian and Yang (2005) have a detailed discussion on the background of this issue.
2See Diener and Seligman (2004) for a review.
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few economic models have been proposed to study people’s happiness,3 and partly because of this,
the economics of happiness is regarded as non-mainstream economics and has been neglected. More
importantly, it also seems unlikely that non-income factors alone can completely explain the East-
erlin Paradox. On the one hand, the increase in income seems too dramatic to be counterbalanced
by the decrease in non-income factors in many countries. For example, Japan’s real GDP per capita
in 1987 was five times higher than in 1958, yet the overall happiness remained stationary. On the
other hand, some non-income factors, such as leisure and environment, have improved, deepening
the Easterlin Paradox rather than solving it (Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2006).
The social comparison approach takes no account of the interactions between income and non-
income factors in promoting happiness, so that it fails to explain other aspects of the relationship
between income and well-being. In particular, many studies find that “happiness seems to rise
with income up to a point, but not beyond it.” (Graham 2005, p. 4) For example, Layard (2005)
proposes that extra money buys no happiness once personal income rises above USD20,000. In
the literature, this critical point is commonly explained as the exogenous level of income which
is necessary to maintain the basic needs of life. In this paper, in contrast, we are going to show
that such a critical point can be endogenously generated by the interaction between income and
non-income factors.
It may be noted there is some new development on the Easterlin paradox. Recently, Stevenson
and Wolfers (2008) reassess the Easterlin Paradox with recent data. They establish a positive link
between average levels of subjective well-being and GDP per capita across countries. However,
we will show that, for a certain class of economic environments specified in the paper, whether
Easterlin paradox appears depends on the level of non-income factors.
Specifically, we develop a theoretical model in which individuals derive utility from both income
and non-income factors, but only the income factor exhibits the social comparison effect. It is
shown that Pareto efficiency will require free disposal of a certain amount of income once the
income reaches some critical level, whose magnitude is determined by the endowment of non-
income factors. In consequence, given the non-income factors, raising the income of all beyond the
critical level would not raise the happiness of all. In addition, economic growth will eventually
3Exceptions are a series of studies by Yew-Kwang Ng and his coauthors (Ng and Wang, 1993; Ng and Ng, 2001;
Ng, 2003).
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decrease social welfare if the increased income is exhausted in equilibrium and government policies
have corrected all the market failures in the pecuniary domain. Those results lead to an important
policy prescription: when the critical income level is achieved, improving non-income factors is the
only way to raise well-being.
Therefore, integrating the “omitted variables” approach and the social comparison approach
sheds new light on the understanding of the Easterlin paradox. On the one hand, income social
comparison justifies the existence of a critical income point beyond which more income does not
make people happier. On the other hand, non-income factors determine the magnitude of the
critical income level, i.e., improving non-income factors such as health and human rights can push
the critical point to a higher level.
We also provide some preliminary empirical evidence to test our theoretical predictions. Specif-
ically, we obtain estimates for the model’s implied critical income levels from the World Value
Survey, and find that for countries whose incomes are below their estimated critical levels, eco-
nomic growth has a positive effect on happiness; but for those whose incomes are above the critical
levels, economic growth has no effect, or even negative effect, on happiness. These findings corrob-
orate our theoretical explanations of the differing evolution of happiness in different countries.
On top of the results we obtained, this paper per se also illuminates the possibility of integrating
happiness studies into mainstream economics, since we conduct our theoretical analysis within a
standard economics textbook model and with standard economics concepts like Pareto efficiency
and social welfare functions.
Besides the “omitted variables” approach and the social comparison approach, there are other
explanations to the Easterlin Paradox. The hedonic adaptation theory (e.g., Frederick and Loewen-
stein, 1999), known as habit formation in economics, says that extra income initially provides extra
pleasure, but it is usually only transitory, because people become hedonically adapted to the higher
income. The set point theory states that every individual goes back to a presumed happiness level
over time (e.g., Easterlin, 2003). Some researchers claim that the happiness data are themselves
misleading, because happiness scores are not comparable among people, and people redefine their
happiness scores over time.4 Our results complement this literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, highlights the
4See Di Tella and MacCulloch (2006) for a discussion.
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different roles of income and non-income factors in promoting happiness, and gives an answer
to the Easterlin Paradox. Section 3 considers some extensions to the basic model, and section
4 provides some preliminary evidence. Section 5 concludes. All the proofs are collected in an
appendix.
2 The Model
In this section, we first describe the model and underscore the interpretation of the goods and
the motivation of the utility functions. Then, we rely on two basic economics concepts, Pareto
efficiency and social welfare, to explain two interesting phenomena: (i) at an individual level,
raising everyone’s income will not necessarily increase everyone’s happiness; and (ii) at a society
level, economic growth is not necessarily accompanied by increased social happiness (i.e., the East-
erlin Paradox). Both explanations highlight the importance of improving non-income factors in
promoting individual and social happiness.
2.1 Economic Environment
Consider an exchange economy with I ≥ 2 consumers who consume two types of goods. Good
m indexes the income factor and good n indexes non-income factors such as health, marriage,
environment, employment status, that is, all the other factors considered by psychologists to explain
the differences in subjective well-being across countries.
We offer two explanations for our categorization of goods. Good m could be understood as
first material good and good n as non-material good. In reality, good m roughly corresponds to
those goods and services that are currently included in GDP, and good n corresponds to those not
included. The first interpretation is consistent with the empirical happiness studies in which GDP
is used as a measure of the material well-being of a society. Good m can also be interpreted as
positional good and good n as non-positional good. This interpretation is based on the fact that
social comparison does not operate equally across different goods. In economics, positional goods
refers to “those things whose value depends relatively strongly on how they compare with things
owned by others. Goods that depend relatively less strongly on such comparisons will be called
non-positional goods.” (Frank, 1985, p. 101)
5
The above two explanations are in fact consistent. The positional goods literature has proposed
the following empirically supported hypotheses: “(1) Income is more positional than leisure...(3)
Private goods are more positional (competitive) than public goods (cf. Ng, 1987), (4) Consumption
goods such as clothing and housing are more positional than health and safety.” (Solnick and
Hemenway, 2006, p. 147) These hypotheses are basically saying that material goods are more
positional than non-material goods. Easterlin (2003) also argues that social comparison in the
“pecuniary domain” is stronger than in the “nonpecuniary domain”. This is true because in the
material goods domain, comparison is easily done, but health, family life, etc., “are less accessible to
public scrutiny than material possessions” (Easterlin, 2003, p. 11181), or they are “inconspicuous”
consumption (Frank, 2004). Thus, preferences must be interdependent with respect to positional
goods.
In the subsequent discussions, we will refer to goodm as income good, and good n as non-income
good. Initially, there are m¯ units of income good and n¯ units of non-income good available. Con-
sumer i’s consumption of the two goods is denoted by a vector (mi, ni), i = 1, ..., I. Assume that
the consumption of good m exhibits a negative externality such that the utility of consumer i is ad-
versely affected by other consumers’ income good consumption, m−i = (m1, ...,mi−1,mi+1, ...,mI).
Since good n refers to non-positional good, we assume the consumption of good n has no social
comparison effect. Consumer i’s utility function is then denoted as ui(mi, ni;m−i), which is con-
tinuously differentiable, ∂ui∂mi > 0,
∂ui
∂ni
> 0, ∂ui∂mj < 0,
∂2ui
∂m2i
< 0, and ∂
2ui
∂m2j
≤ 0, for i, j = 1, ..., I and
j 6= i. As such, ∂ui∂mi may be regarded as agent i’s marginal benefit from his consumption mi and
∂ui
∂mj
may be regarded as agent i’s marginal cost (negative externality) resulting from the other’s
consumption mj .
Recently, Vostroknutov (2007) has provided an axiomatic foundation that allows interdependent
preferences to have a representation which separates the utility of consumption from the utility of
social comparison. He argues that the consumption part of the preferences should depend only
on the possessions of the agents themselves, whereas the social comparison part of the preferences
should depend on others’ possessions relative to their own. Vostroknutov uses Anscombe and
Aumann’s (1963) framework to show that a group of reasonable axioms leads to the following
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utility representation for interdependent preferences:
ui(mi, ni;m−i) = f (mi, ni) +
∑
j 6=i
pijg (mi,mj) , (1)
where the the first term, f (mi, ni), is the utility from consuming income and non-income goods, and
the second term,
∑
j 6=i pijg (mi,mj), is the utility from social comparison in income. The function
g (mi,mj) describes the specific way that consumer i cares about her income consumption relative
to one other consumer j, and {pij}j 6=i are the weights that represent the importance of each other
consumer to agent i.
For computational simplicity, in our basic model, we adopt the following specific function form
to illustrate the essential idea:
ui(mi, ni;m−i) = mαi n
1−α
i − β
∑
j 6=imj
I − 1 , with α ∈ (0, 1) , β > 0, i = 1, ..., I. (2)
Here, a standard textbook Cobb-Douglas function is used to represent the utility from consumption
of one’s own goods, and a simple linear function is used to the capture the income social comparison
effect. In terms of equation (1), we have f (mi, ni) = mαi n
1−α
i , pij =
β
I−1 and g (mi,mj) = −mj . Our
specification of social comparison is also consistent with Easterlin (1995, 2001), who uses average
income to capture the negative consumption externality of m−i. In section 3.3, we demonstrate
that our results also hold for more general utility functions given by equation (1), provided that
the income social comparison effect is sufficiently large.
More comments about the function form are in order. First, the current utility function assumes
that all the consumers are in the same reference group. One will see that this assumption can be
relaxed, and an extension of the basic model to multiple reference groups yields similar results in
section 3.1. Second, we assume that there is a negative externality in the consumption of the income
good, but there is no externality in the consumption of the non-income good. So our assumption
is an extreme case in which there is no social comparison in non-income goods. By relaxing this
assumption in section 3.2, we will see that it does not affect our main results. Third, some of the
non-income goods are public rather than private goods, such as democracy and inflation. But the
main qualitative result of this paper still holds if we assume that good n is a public good.
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2.2 Pareto Efficiency and Social Happiness Maximization
2.2.1 Pareto Efficiency: WhenWill Raising the Incomes of All Increase the Happiness
of All?
When evaluating the performance of an economic system, economists usually adopt the criterion
of Pareto efficiency. Implicit in every Pareto efficient outcome is the condition that all possible
improvements to a society have been exhausted. If an allocation is Pareto inefficient, some alterna-
tive allocation can be supported by consensus. In particular, Pareto efficiency is a suitable concept
for answering Easterlin’s question: “will raising the incomes of all increase the happiness of all?”
(Easterlin, 1995)
Definition 1 An allocation of income and non-income goods {mi, ni}Ii=1 ∈ R2I++5 is feasible if∑I
i=1mi ≤ m¯ and
∑I
i=1 ni ≤ n¯.6 An allocation of income and non-income goods {mi, ni}Ii=1
is Pareto optimal (efficient) if it is feasible, and there does not exist another feasible allocation,
{m′i, n′i}Ii=1, such that ui(m′i, n′i;m′−i) ≥ ui(mi, ni;m−i) for all i = 1, ..., I and ui(m′i, n′i;m′−i) >
ui(mi, ni;m−i) for some i.
For our model, Pareto efficient outcomes {m∗i , n∗i }Ii=1 are characterized by the following problem:
(PE)

max
{mi,ni}Ii=1∈R2I++
mαI n
1−α
I − βm1+...+mI−1I−1
s.t.
∑I
i=1mi ≤ m¯,∑I
i=1 ni ≤ n¯,
mαi n
1−α
i − β
∑
j 6=imj
I−1 ≥ u∗i ,∀i = 1, ..., I − 1,
where u∗i = m
∗α
i n
∗1−α
i − β
∑
j 6=im
∗
j
I−1 .
By solving the above problem in appendix A, we have the following technical result.
Lemma 1 For a pure exchange economy with the above specific utility functions, it is necessary
to destroy some income good in order to achieve Pareto efficient outcomes if and only if m¯ >(
α
β
) 1
1−α
n¯. Specifically,
5Here, we implicitly assume the consumption sets of all consumers are open sets R2++, in order to easily apply the
Kuhn-Tucker theorem.
6If both weak inequalities hold with equality, then the allocation is called ballanced.
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(1) When m¯ >
(
α
β
) 1
1−α
n¯, income destruction is necessary to achieve Pareto efficient alloca-
tions, and the set of Pareto optimal allocations is characterized by {mi, ni}
I
i=1 ∈ R2I++ : mi =
(
α
β
) 1
1−α
ni,∀i = 1, ..., I,
and
∑I
i=1 ni = n¯,
(
α
β
) 1
1−α
n¯ =
∑I
i=1mi < m¯.

(2) When m¯ ≤
(
α
β
) 1
1−α
n¯, all income good should be exhausted to achieve Pareto efficient
allocations, and the set of Pareto optimal allocations is characterized by {mi, ni}
I
i=1 ∈ R2I++ : mi = m¯n¯ ni,∀i = 1, ..., I,
and
∑I
i=1 ni = n¯,
∑I
i=1mi = m¯.
 .
Lemma 1 shows that once income level m¯ achieves the critical point
(
α
β
) 1
1−α
n¯, one has to freely
dispose of some income good to achieve Pareto efficiency; otherwise the resulting allocations will
be Pareto inefficient. This result provides an answer to the question of when raising the incomes
of all will increase the happiness of all (Easterlin, 1995). Figure 1 illustrates how.
FIGURE 1 GOES HERE
In Figure 1, any point corresponds to a particular economy, with the vertical (horizontal) axis
coordinate representing the aggregate consumption of the income (non-income) good. Since we do
not specify the individual consumption bundles at any point, many allocations are compatible with
an economy. But we assume that any underlying allocation, which could be implemented by a
market mechanism with corrective government policies, in the non-shaded area is Pareto efficient.
In contrast, lemma 1 indicates that the allocations in the shaded area will be Pareto inefficient,
because the aggregate consumption of the income good is greater than the critical values.
Suppose the economy is initially at point A, which is relatively poor in terms of the income good.
Then increase everyone’s income while keeping the non-income constant, such that the economy
moves to another point B. Economic growth of this kind could potentially increase everyone’s
happiness, because in a richer society (point B), any initial allocation at point A is still feasible
but not Pareto efficient by lemma 1, i.e., there is a way to improve everyone’s well-being when the
economy moves from A to B.
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However, if we keep increasing everyone’s income without changing the non-income good from
point B to point C, then this change will definitely hurt some individuals. To see why, recalling
lemma 1, once the income endowment exceeds the critical point, (α/β)
1
1−α n¯, income destruction is
necessary to achieve Pareto efficient outcomes. Therefore, the original allocation in point B, which
is assumed to be Pareto efficient in economy B, is still Pareto efficient in the more aﬄuent economy
C. As a result, some individuals are worse off as the economy moves from B to C with different
allocations, which is a direct implication of the definition of Pareto efficiency. Thus, raising income
alone may not benefit everyone in the economy.
However, if we simultaneously increase income and non-income goods, as from B to D, then
everyone could be better off, following a similar discussion as in the change from A to B. The result
has important policy implications, suggesting that improving income and non-income factors could
potentially support a growth path along which everyone is sustainably getting happier.
2.2.2 Social Welfare Maximization: When Does Economic Growth Produce Social
Happiness?
How does one evaluate people’s happiness as a whole? What is the corresponding economics concept
of the social happiness in the Easterlin Paradox? These questions involve comparing utilities across
different individuals. In economics, the concept of social welfare function has been developed to
achieve this.
A social welfare function (SWF), W (u1, ..., uI), takes the individual utilities as arguments and
generates a real number to represent the judgement of the whole society about different allocations.
A SWF is usually assumed to be strictly monotone in individual utilities. A commonly used SWF
is the utilitarian SWF:
W (u1, ..., uI) =
I∑
i=1
aiui, with ai ≥ 0,
which says that social happiness is a linear sum of weighted utilities of individuals. In the happiness
studies, some psychologists (e.g., Diener and Seligman, 2004) use mean life satisfaction to represent
a society’s happiness, which is essentially equivalent to adopting a utilitarian SWF with equal
weights.
An ideal society should operate at allocations that maximize some SWF subject to the resource
constraints. Clearly, the optimal allocations have to be Pareto efficient, given the monotonicity
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of a SWF. The optimal allocations could be implemented by a market mechanism with corrective
government policies. For this reason, we will refer to the social happiness in the Easterlin Paradox
literature as the maximum social welfare that could be achieved with feasible allocations.7 In
general, the values of social happiness depend on the choices of the SWF. Following lemma 1, we
present the following proposition to characterize the behavior of social happiness in our model.
Proposition 1 In a pure exchange economy with the above specific utility functions,
(1) if m¯ ≤
(
α
β
) 1
1−α
n¯, i.e., if the economy is relatively poor, then for any choice of SWF, raising
income alone will increase social happiness;
(2) if m¯ >
(
α
β
) 1
1−α
n¯, i.e., if the economy is relatively rich, then for any choice of SWF, raising
income alone will not change social happiness; if in addition, no free disposal of income is allowed,
then raising income alone will decrease social happiness; and
(3) if m¯ >
(
α
β
) 1
1−α
n¯, the only way to increase social happiness is to increase the amount of non-
income good.
Proposition 1 not only provides an explanation of the Easterlin Paradox, but also gives policy
prescriptions to resolve the paradox, i.e., promoting income and non-income goods in a balanced
way. To better understand our result, let us choose a simple utilitarian social welfare function,
W (u1, ..., uI) = u1 + u2 + ... + uI , which comports with using mean life satisfaction to represent
social happiness in the literature.
Plugging the Pareto efficient allocations given by lemma 1 into the social welfare function
W (u1, ..., uI) = u1 + u2 + ...+ uI , social happiness is:
W =
 m¯
αn¯1−α − βm¯ if m¯ ≤
(
α
β
) 1
1−α
n¯(
β
α − β
)(
α
β
) 1
1−α
n¯ if m¯ >
(
α
β
) 1
1−α
n¯
.
If free disposal is not allowed, i.e., if all resource constraints have to be balanced, as is more likely
the case in reality, then social happiness is given by
W = m¯αn¯1−α − βm¯,
7If one prefers to interpret social happiness as the social welfare evaluated at a competitive market equilibrium,
then the following proposition 1 would change to a slightly different version: the effect of raising income on social
happiness has an upper bound, and increasing non-income good will raise this upper bound.
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for all m¯ > 0 and n¯ > 0. How social happiness varies with income m¯ for a fixed n¯ is graphically
shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2 illustrates the possibility that increasing income alone can bring happiness only up
to a point. This result helps us understand the different evolutions of happiness in countries with
similar growth performances, for example, there is no trend in the U.S., a decline in Britain, Italy
and Germany, and an increase in France (c.f. Cooper et al., 2001). Specifically, if the non-income
factors have not changed significantly, for those countries whose income levels are lower than their
critical points, economic growth produces happiness; for those countries whose income levels exceed
their critical points, economic growth has no impact on happiness if free disposal is allowed, or even
a negative impact on happiness if free disposal is impossible. In section 4, we obtain estimates of the
critical points from the World Value Survey and verify the above explanation for some countries,
such as the USA, Ireland, the Netherlands.
FIGURE 2 GOES HERE
Our model suggests that government policies should be tilted towards boosting non-income
good when the income level is close to the critical point. A government can actually play an
important role in many non-material domains, for example, fighting inflation, improving democracy
and freedom, preventing crime. Diener and Seligman (2004) argue that government can also find a
way to improve social relations, relieve mental disorder, etc. They also suggest that the government
should build a system of well-being indicators and focus on directly improving well-being. All of
these suggestions by psychologists can be supported by our theoretical model.
3 Extensions
In our basic model, there is only one reference group, there is no social comparison for non-income
good, and a specific utility function is used. All these assumptions will be relaxed in this section,
and our main result (proposition 1) will still be found to be valid.
3.1 Multiple Reference Groups
When people make social comparisons, they usually compare themselves to others in the same
reference group, say, people in the same city or of the same profession. In this subsection, assume
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there are K groups, group k has Ik consumers, and consumers compare themselves with the other
agents in the same group. Specifically, a typical consumer i in group k has the following utility
function
uik (mik, nik;m−ik) = m
αk
ik n
1−αk
ik − βk
∑
j 6=imjk
Ik − 1 ,
where 0 < αk < 1, βk > 0, and m−ik denotes the vector (m1k, ...,mi−1,k,mi+1,k, ...mIkk). Our basic
model corresponds to K = 1 and I1 = I.
Two layers of allocation problems are involved in finding the Pareto efficient outcomes: (i)
allocate the society’s aggregate resources among groups; and (ii) allocate the group’s aggregate
resources among consumers within the group. We are going to start with the second problem.
Suppose group k has a total of (m¯k, n¯k) units of income and non-income goods available. Ac-
cording to proposition 1, at Pareto efficiency allocations, the critical income level for group k is
m¯Ck =
(
αk
βk
) 1
1−αk n¯k. That is, if m¯k > m¯Ck , then Pareto efficiency requires free disposal of income
good within group k. Therefore, for any given endowment vector (m¯, n¯) of the whole economy,
Pareto efficient allocation would end up with either m¯k ≥ m¯Ck or m¯k ≤ m¯Ck for all k. Otherwise,
i.e., if m¯k > m¯Ck for some k and m¯k′ < m¯
C
k′ for some k
′ 6= k at the same time, then transferring
income from group k to group k′ would lead to a Pareto improvement.
Given the above discussion, if the society’s aggregate income is relatively high, such that
m¯ >
∑K
k=1
(
αk
βk
) 1
1−αk n¯k, then there will be destruction of income good within some group at
Pareto efficient allocations. At this time, increasing income goods alone would result in the same
set of Pareto efficient allocations as before, and consequently would have no effect on increasing
social happiness indexed by any social welfare function. We formalize this result in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2 In the economy with multiple reference groups,
(1) if the economy is poor (i.e. m¯ ≤ ∑Kk=1 (αkβk ) 11−αk n¯k), then increase in income alone will
increase social happiness; and
(2) if the economy is rich (i.e. m¯ >
∑K
k=1
(
αk
βk
) 1
1−αk n¯k), then increase in income alone has no
effect on social happiness, and the only way to produce social happiness is to improve non-income
good.
13
3.2 The Social Comparison Effect of Non-Income Good
Although non-income good is less subject to social comparison than income good, it might be too
restrictive to assume that non-income good does not have any negative externality. This subsection
relaxes this assumption.
To ease exposition, consider an economy with only two consumers. Of course, there is only one
reference group in this case. Let the utility function be
ui(mi, ni;mj) = mαi n
1−α
i − βmj − γnj ,
where α ∈ (0, 1) , β > 0, γ > 0, i ∈ {1, 2} , j ∈ {1, 2} , j 6= i. The parameters β and γ capture
the social comparison effects of income and non-income goods, respectively. In addition, assume
that the economy adopts a utilitarian social welfare function. That is, we have the following
maximization problem:
(SCN)

max
(m1,n1,m2,n2)∈R4++
mα1n
1−α
1 − βm2 − γn2 +mα2n1−α2 − βm1 − γn1
s.t. m1 +m2 ≤ m¯, n1 + n2 ≤ n¯.
Let β
1
1−αγ
1
α be a measure of the joint social comparison effect of income and non-income goods.
It can be shown that the joint social comparison effect has to be smaller than an upper bound,
α
1
1−α (1− α) 1α , in order for everyone to consume both goods in an allocation which maximizes
social welfare. This condition will hold even when the income social comparison effect, β, is very
large, as long as the non-income social comparison effect, γ, is sufficiently small. For example,
when α = 1/2, if γ = 1/16, then β can take values up to 4. The relative magnitudes of β and γ
might correspond to reality, as we argued before.
In addition, if income is large enough relative to the non-income good,
m¯ ≥
(
α
β
) 1
1−α
n¯,
then social welfare maximization will require free disposal of income good. Social happiness is given
by
W =
[(
α
β
) α
1−α
− β
(
α
β
) 1
1−α
− γ
]
n¯,
where the coefficient
(
α
β
) α
1−α−β
(
α
β
) 1
1−α−γ can be shown to be positive by β 11−αγ 1α < α 11−α (1− α) 1α .
We state this result formally in the following proposition, which is proved in appendix B.
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Proposition 3 Suppose that both goods have social comparison effects in the economy and that the
joint social comparison is small, i.e., β
1
1−αγ
1
α < α
1
1−α (1− α) 1α . Then,
(1) in a poor society (i.e. m¯ ≤
(
α
β
) 1
1−α
n¯), raising income alone will increase social happiness,
indexed by the utilitarian SWF with equal weights; and
(2) in a rich society (i.e. m¯ >
(
α
β
) 1
1−α
n¯), raising income alone has no effect on social happiness,
indexed by the utilitarian SWF with equal weights; the only way to produce social happiness is to
improve non-income good.
3.3 General Utility Functions
The results obtained in section 2 can be extended to economies with general utility functions given
by (1). For simplicity, consider a symmetric two-consumer economy and use a simple utilitarian
SWF to measure social happiness. In Tian and Yang (2008), the Pareto efficiency problem is
considered in the context of more general utility functions with externalities.
As indicated before, consumer i’s utility function, equation (1), has its axiomatic foundation
provided by Vostroknutov (2007). In a symmetric two-consumer economy, equation (1) changes to:
ui(mi, ni;m−i) = f (mi, ni) + g (mi,mj) , (3)
where the functions f (·, ·) and g (·, ·) are twice continuously differentiable. We will solve the
following maximization problem to find the allocations that maximize social welfare:
(GUF )

max
(m1,n1,m2,n2)∈R4++
f (m1, n1) + g (m1,m2) + f (m2, n2) + g (m2,m1)
s.t. m1 +m2 ≤ m¯, n1 + n2 ≤ n¯.
The first order conditions of the problem (GUF) are given in appendix C.
It can be shown that the way in which social happiness varies with income depends on the value
of the following function:
H (m, n¯) = f1 (m, n¯/2) + g1 (m,m) + g2 (m,m) ,
where f1 (·, ·) is the partial derivative of f (·, ·) with respect to its first argument; a similar ex-
planation applies to g1 (·, ·) and g2 (·, ·). In our basic model with I = 2, we have f1 (m, n¯/2) =
αmα−1 (n¯/2)1−α, g1 (m,m) = 0 and g2 (m,m) = −β. The value H (m, n¯) measures the marginal
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effect of income on happiness given n¯ units of non-income good. The first term, f1 (m, n¯/2), is
the marginal utility derived from the consumption of an extra unit of income good; the second
term, g1 (m,m), is the marginal utility derived from the increase of some consumer’s social rank;
and the third term, g2 (m,m), is the marginal disutility that comes from the decrease of the other
consumer’s social rank.
Given that f1 (m, n¯/2) and g1 (m,m) are marginal benefits and that g2 (m,m) is marginal cost,
the following assumptions sound reasonable:
(A1) f1 (m, n¯/2), g1 (m,m) and g2 (m,m) are weakly decreasing in m, and at least one of them
is strictly decreasing in m;
(A2) limm→0 [f1 (m, n¯/2) + g1 (m,m)] > limm→0 g2 (m,m); and
(A3) limm→∞ [f1 (m, n¯/2) + g1 (m,m)] < limm→∞ g2 (m,m).
Assumption (A1) states that the marginal benefits are diminishing in income good, but the marginal
cost is increasing in income good. Assumptions (A2) and (A3) say that the marginal benefits
outweigh the marginal cost when income is low and that the reverse is true when income is high.
Clearly, the utility function of our basic model satisfies these two assumptions.
Assumptions (A1)-(A3) lead to the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Suppose the quasiconcave utility functions given by (3) satisfy assumptions (A1)-
(A3). Then, there exists a critical point, m¯C , which is implicitly determined by H
(
m¯C/2, n¯
)
= 0
such that
(1) in a poor society (i.e., m¯ ≤ m¯C), raising income alone will increase social happiness, as indexed
by the utilitarian SWF with equal weights; and
(2) in a rich society (i.e., m¯ > m¯C), raising income alone has no effect on social happiness, as
indexed by the utilitarian SWF with equal weights; increase in social happiness can be achieved only
by raising non-income good.
4 Empirical Evidence
In this section, we fit the data to our theoretical model to estimate the critical values, and provide
some preliminary evidence to support our theoretical results. We demonstrate that economic growth
does increase happiness for those countries whose income levels are lower than their estimated
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critical values, but does not for those whose income levels are larger than the estimated critical
values.
4.1 Data
Our data sets are the World Values Survey (WVS) and the ERS International Macroeconomic
Data Set. TheWorld Values Survey has four successive waves, in 1981-1982, 1989-1993, 1995-1998,
and 1999-2003. Different waves cover different but overlapping countries. The most recent survey
covers more than 70 countries. We do a cross-nations analysis, in which each country from each
wave constitutes one observation.8 Our main purpose is to get estimates of α and β in the utility
function (2), and calculate the model-implied critical values.
The WVS provides a life satisfaction variable, scaled from 1 (Dissatisfied) to 10 (Satisfied). In
line with the previous empirical happiness studies, we use the mean satisfaction to index happiness
u, while the real per capita income (in 2000 USD) in the ERS International Macroeconomic Data
Set is used to represent the income explanatory variable m.
The non-income good n in our model should be understood as a composite good made up of a
large number of factors with significant influence on happiness. According to the previous empirical
studies,9 we focus on the following non-income factors available from the WVS data set: state of
health, marital status, human rights and time with friends. We have tried other non-income factors,
for example, age, and got similar results not reported here. Other variables in the WVS, such as
corruption, could also serve as candidates for non-income factors which we did not explore in the
analysis. The main reason is that in many cases the data are missing for a large number of countries
in some waves, even for the U.S. and Britain.
Because we have a small sample size in the cross-nations analysis, we are not going to use many
non-income variables in one regression, but instead, we will try different ways to combine two of
them in a Cobb-Douglas form to index the composite non-income good. That is, we assume
n = nφ11 n
φ2
2 , (4)
where φ1 > 0, φ2 > 0, and n1, n2 denote two non-income factors.
8This is aggregate information. The World Values Survey contains data at the individual level.
9For a review, see Diener and Seligman (2004).
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All non-income factors are ordered data in the WVS. For example, the variable A009 asks “(a)ll
in all, how would you describe your state of health these days?” The correspondents can choose
any answer from “very good” to “very poor.” We use percentage to measure n1 and n2 so that the
explanatory variables will be independent of the order scale. To be specific, “state of health” is the
percentage of respondents who report good health conditions; “marital status” is the percentage
who are “married” or “living together as married” (X007 in the WVS); “human rights” is the
percentage who report “there is a lot of respect for individual human rights” (E124 in the WVS);
and “time with friends” is the percentage who visit friends frequently (A058 in the WVS).
In addition, in order to control the effect of the dissolution of the Former Soviet Union, a
dummy variable is introduced. For Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine, this
dummy variable takes value 1 and for the other countries, it takes value 0. Table 1 reports the data
summary.
TABLE 1 GOES HERE
4.2 Results
We estimate the following utility function,
u = mα
(
nφ11 n
φ2
2
)1−α − βm− κD, (5)
where D denotes the dummy variable to indicate whether the country belongs to the Former Soviet
Union. Equation (5) implicitly assumes that individuals are identical within one country and
compare themselves only with other people in the same country.
We do a non-linear least squared estimation with Eviews4, and the results for various combi-
nations of non-income factors are reported in Table 2.10 For example, regression I chooses n1 and
n2 as “state of health” and “marital status” and gives the following estimated values: αˆ = 0.09,
βˆ = 3.22e-5, φˆ1 = 0.23, φˆ2 = 0.08, and κˆ = 0.52. There are 147 observations included in this
regression, and the adjusted R2 is 0.59. The t-statistics reported in parentheses indicate that αˆ
and φˆ1 are significant at the 1% level and the other parameters are significant at the 5% level.
Similarly, regression II gives the result based on taking n1 and n2 as “state of health” and “human
10Graham (2005) pointed out that the result of the OLS method is almost the same as that of the ordered probit
or logit model.
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rights,” and so forth. The signs of the estimated coefficients are consistent with the previous works.
For example, due to the instability effect of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, belonging to the
Former Soviet Union has a negative effect on happiness.
TABLE 2 GOES HERE
The patterns of coefficients are similar across all regressions. We focus on those regressions
whose parameters are all significant: regression I (n1 =“state of health”, n2 =“marital status”),
regression III (n1 =“marital status”, n2 =“human rights”), and regression V (n1 =“human rights”,
n2 =“time with friends”). According to equation (4), we can estimate the composite non-income
factor by
nˆ = nφˆ11 n
φˆ2
2 ,
which gives the critical income level of one country in a specific year:
mˆ =
(
αˆ
βˆ
) 1
1−αˆ
nˆ. (6)
Table 3 and 4 report the estimated critical income levels for the U.S., Japan, Ireland, the Nether-
lands, and Puerto Rico.
TABLE 3 GOES HERE
Table 3 shows that in the 1990s, both the U.S. and Japan were operating in the inefficient area,
because their real income levels exceeded the estimated critical values. Moreover, the estimated
critical income levels did not change much over time (regression I), suggesting that the non-income
good did not improve much in the last decade. Therefore, according to proposition 1, we are not
surprised to observe the flat trace of both countries’ happiness in the last 10 years. Note that
the critical levels are also similar across regressions. For example, the critical income level of the
U.S. in 1999 is 24729.09 when “state of health” and “marital status” are selected as non-income
factors (regression I), 25816.65 when “marital status” and “human rights” are non-income factors
(regression III), and 24763.60 when “human rights” and “time with friends” are non-income factors
(regression V). Thus, the results are quite robust.
TABLE 4 GOES HERE
The estimated model can also predict an increase in happiness for countries such as Albania,
Ireland, Mexico, the Netherlands, Puerto Rico, Slovenia. Table 4 reports the results for Ireland,
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the Netherlands, and Puerto Rico. We could see that, in these three countries, the real incomes
do not exceed the estimated critical levels (which are again almost constant over time), and the
increase in income does add to happiness.
In addition, we fix the non-income good at the mean of its estimates, n˜, and get an explicit
relationship between happiness and income:
u = n˜1−αˆmαˆ − βˆm.
Then, we calculate the response of happiness to an increase in income, ∂u∂m
m
u =
αˆn˜1−αˆmαˆ−βˆm
n˜1−αˆmαˆ−βˆm ;
the result based on regression V is reported in Table 5. According to regression V, the mean of
estimated non-income good is n˜ = 3.10, and the estimated preference parameters are αˆ = 0.11 and
βˆ = 3.85e-5. Plugging those estimates into equation (6), we find an estimated critical income level
at 23, 405 USD.
TABLE 5 GOES HERE
Table 5 illustrates the decreasing elasticity in income for a given amount of non-income good;
the elasticity does not vary much once income level exceeds 10, 000 dollars, and will become negative
once income is beyond the estimated critical level, 23, 405 USD.11 This observation is consistent
with the previous cross-nations studies, which state that below USD 10, 000 per capita, the effect
of income is significant in increasing happiness, and above that level, the effect is fairly small or
null (Frey and Stutzer, 2002; Helliwell, 2003; Schyns, 2003).
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop an economic theory for studying happiness. Our model highlights the idea
that social comparison affects utility less in nonpecuniary than in pecuniary domains. We show
that there is a critical point beyond which rising income alone has no effect on social happiness.
More importantly, the critical income level is determined by the level of non-income factors in
the society, and improving non-income factors could raise the critical income point. We provide
empirical evidence for our theoretical predictions.
11If we allow free disposal of income, then the elasticities vanish for those income larger than the critical level.
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These results have important policy implications. In particular, government should promote
balanced growth between income and non-income factors. In many countries, the reality might
be that policy makers have overemphasized economic growth, and the economies have produced
too much income good, which has led to a happiness stagnation problem. A simple but effective
solution to this problem is to convert income good into non-income good.
Appendix
Appendix A. Proof of proposition 1.
In the problem (PE), the Pareto efficient points are completely characterized by the first order
conditions (FOCs), because the objective function and constraints are continuously differentiable
and concave on R2I++.
Define the Lagrangian function as:
L = mαI n
1−α
I − β
(
m1 + ...+mI−1
I − 1
)
+ λm
(
m¯−
I∑
i=1
mi
)
+ λn
(
n¯−
I∑
i=1
ni
)
+µ1
[
mα1n
1−α
1 − β
(
m2 +m3 + ...+mI−1 +mI
I − 1
)
− u∗1
]
+µ2
[
mα2n
1−α
2 − β
(
m1 +m3 + ...+mI−1 +mI
I − 1
)
− u∗2
]
+...
+µI−1
[
mαI−1n
1−α
I−1 − β
(
m1 +m2 + ...+mI−2 +mI
I − 1
)
− u∗I−1
]
.
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We can obtain the following FOCs:
mi : − β
I − 1 − λm + µiαm
α−1
i n
1−α
i − β
(
µ1 + ...+ µi−1 + µi+1 + ...+ µI−1
I − 1
)
= 0, (7)
ni : −λn + µi (1− α)mαi n−αi = 0, (8)
mI : αmα−1I n
1−α
I − λm − β
(
µ1 + ...+ µi−1 + µi + µi+1 + ...+ µI−1
I − 1
)
= 0, (9)
nI : (1− α)mαI n−αI − λn = 0, (10)
λm :
I∑
i=1
mi ≤ m¯, λm ≥ 0, λm
(
m¯−
I∑
i=1
mi
)
= 0, (11)
λn :
I∑
i=1
ni ≤ n¯, λn ≥ 0, λn
(
n¯−
I∑
i=1
ni
)
= 0, (12)
µi : mαi n
1−α
i − β
∑
j 6=imj
I − 1 ≥ u
∗
i , µi ≥ 0, µi
(
mαi n
1−α
i − β
∑
j 6=imj
I − 1 − u
∗
i
)
= 0, (13)
where (7), (8) and (13) hold for any i = 1, ..., I − 1.
By (10), we have λn > 0. Thus, by (12), we have
I∑
i=1
ni = n¯. (14)
Using (7)-(10), we have
µi
(
µ
1−α
α
i αm
α−1
I n
1−α
I +
β
I − 1
)
= αmα−1I n
1−α
I +
β
I − 1 ,
which implies that µi = 1 for any i, since the left hand side is an increasing function in µi.
By µi = 1, λn > 0, equations (7) and (8), we have
λm = λ
− 1−α
α
n α (1− α)
1−α
α − β. (15)
In addition, (8), (10), µi = 1 and λn > 0 yield
ni = (1− α)
1
α λ
− 1
α
n mi, (16)
for i = 1, 2, ..., I.
Summing up (16) over i and using (14), we have
λn = (1− α)
(∑I
i=1mi
n¯
)α
, (17)
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which implies that,
ni =
min¯∑I
i=1mi
, (18)
for i = 1, 2, ..., I.
Substituting (17) into (15) yields
λm = α
(
n¯∑I
i=1mi
)1−α
− β, (19)
which will be used to determine the critical income level for Pareto efficiency.
Since λm ≥ 0 at equilibrium, there are two cases to consider:
Case 1. λm > 0. In this case, we must have
∑I
i=1mi <
(
α
β
) 1
1−α
n¯ by (19), and thus by (11),
I∑
i=1
mi = m¯. (20)
Therefore, if m¯ <
(
α
β
) 1
1−α
n¯, the income good should be exhausted in order to achieve Pareto
efficiency.
In addition, by (18)
ni =
n¯
m¯
mi, (21)
for i = 1, 2, ..., I.
Case 2. λm = 0. Then, by (19), we must have
∑I
i=1mi =
(
α
β
) 1
1−α
n¯, which is true for any
m¯ ≥
(
α
β
) 1
1−α
n¯.
By (18) and
∑I
i=1mi =
(
α
β
) 1
1−α
n¯, we have
ni =
(
β
α
) 1
1−α
mi, (22)
for i = 1, 2, ..., I.
Summarizing the two cases gives rise to proposition 1.
Appendix B. Proof of proposition 3.
Set up the Lagrangian for problem (SCN) as
L = mα1n
1−α
1 − βm2 − γn2 +mα2n1−α2 − βm1 − γn1
+λm (m¯−m1 −m2) + λn (n¯− n1 − n2) .
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The FOCs related to the choices of m and n are
m1 : αmα−11 n
1−α
1 − β − λm = 0,
n1 : (1− α)mα1n−α1 − γ − λn = 0,
m2 : αmα−12 n
1−α
2 − β − λm = 0,
n2 : (1− α)mα2n−α2 − γ − λn = 0,
which imply (
n1
m1
)1−α
=
(
n2
m2
)1−α
=
β + λm
α
, (23)(
n1
m1
)−α
=
(
n2
m2
)−α
=
γ + λn
1− α . (24)
Equations (23) or (24) implies n1m1 =
n2
m2
. Equations (11), (12), (23) and (24) consist of a system to
characterize the solutions.
There are four cases to consider:
Case 1. λm > 0, λn > 0. In this case, we must have
m1 +m2 = m¯, n1 + n2 = n¯,
which imply that
n1
m1
=
n2
m2
=
n¯
m¯
. (25)
(25), (23) and (24) give us
λm = α
( n¯
m¯
)1−α
− β > 0, (26)
λn = (1− α)
( n¯
m¯
)−α
− γ > 0, (27)
which are true when
(
γ
1−α
) 1
α
< m¯n¯ <
(
α
β
) 1
1−α . This would imply
β
1
1−αγ
1
α ≤ α 11−α (1− α) 1α . (28)
Case 2. λm = 0, λn > 0. By (12) and λn > 0, we have (14).
By (23) and λm = 0,
n1
m1
=
n2
m2
=
(
β
α
) 1
1−α
. (29)
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Equations (29), (14) and (11) require
m¯ ≥
(
β
α
)− 1
1−α
n¯.
By (29) and (24),
λn = (1− α)
(
β
α
)− α
1−α
− γ > 0,
which implies the weak inequality (28) holds.
Case 3. λm > 0, λn = 0. By (11) and λm > 0, we have
m1 +m2 = m¯.
By (24) and λn = 0,
n1
m1
=
n2
m2
=
(
γ
1− α
)− 1
α
. (30)
Equations (30) and (12) imply
m¯ <
(
γ
1− α
) 1
α
n¯.
Equations (23) and (30) require
λm = α
(
γ
1− α
)− 1−α
α
− β > 0,
which is equivalent to β
1
1−αγ
1
α < α
1
1−α (1− α) 1α .
Case 4 λm = 0, λn = 0. By (23) and (24), this is true only when
m1
n1
=
m2
n2
=
(
γ
1− α
) 1
α
=
(
α
β
) 1
1−α
, (31)
which implies
β
1
1−αγ
1
α = α
1
1−α (1− α) 1α .
The conditions in proposition 3 ensure that case 2 holds. The results follow directly.
Appendix C. Proof of proposition 4.
Set up the Lagrangian for problem (GUF) as
L = f (m1, n1) + g (m1,m2) + f (m2, n2) + g (m2,m1)
+λm (m¯−m1 −m2) + λn (n¯− n1 − n2) .
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The FOCs related to the choices of m and n are
m1 :
∂f (m1, n1)
∂m1
+
∂g (m1,m2)
∂m1
+
∂g (m2,m1)
∂m1
− λm = 0, (32)
n1 :
∂f (m1, n1)
∂n1
− λn = 0, (33)
m2 :
∂g (m1,m2)
∂m2
+
∂f (m2, n2)
∂m2
+
∂g (m2,m1)
∂m2
− λm = 0, (34)
n2 :
∂f (m2, n2)
∂n2
− λn = 0. (35)
Equations (32)-(35), (23) and (24) consist of a system to characterize the solutions.
In particular,m1 = m2 ≡ m, n1 = n2 = n¯/2, λn = ∂f(m,n¯/2)∂n1 , and λm = f1 (m, n¯/2)+g1 (m,m)+
g2 (m,m) satisfy this system. Given the quasiconcavity of the objective function, FOCs are both
necessary and sufficient, and the solution is unique. Therefore, we have
λm = f1 (m, n¯/2) + g1 (m,m) + g2 (m,m) ≡ H (m, n¯) ,
which is the marginal effect of increasing income on social happiness, by Envelope theorem. In
addition, assumptions (A1)-(A3) imply that for any fixed n¯, H (m, n¯) varies inversely from positive
to negative as m increases from 0 to +∞. Then, the results follow directly.
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Figure 1 Does Raising the Incomes of All
Increase the Happiness of All?
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Figure 2      Income VS Happiness
Table 1 Data Summary
Min Max Mean S.D. # Obs.
Mean life satisfaction 3.73 8.49 6.63 1.09 187
GDP per capita (2000 US$) 261.00 37459.00 9210.81 9408.34 187
State of health 25.93 89.46 60.64 15.29 148
Marital status 39.81 87.46 64.46 8.20 185
Human rights 0.41 61.90 13.18 11.81 79
Time with friends 58.47 97.78 81.12 10.19 69
Former Soviet Union 0.00 1.00 0.09 0.29 187
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Table 2 Estimation Results (Nonlinear Least Squared)
I II III IV V
α
0.09∗∗∗
(7.17)
0.09∗∗∗
(3.46)
0.13∗∗∗
(7.83)
0.10∗∗∗
(5.00)
0.11∗∗∗
(5.85)
β
3.22e-5∗∗
(2.20)
2.84e-5
(0.93)
4.21e-5∗∗
(2.02)
1.42e-5
(0.64)
3.85e-5∗
(1.78)
State of health
0.23∗∗∗
(6.65)
0.27∗∗∗
(6.15)
Marital status
0.08∗∗
(2.14)
0.20∗∗∗
(7.28)
0.11
(1.63)
Human rights
0.04
(1.59)
0.07∗∗∗
(4.60)
0.05∗∗∗
(3.07)
Time with friends
0.16∗∗
(2.35)
0.23∗∗∗
(7.33)
Former Soviet Union
0.52∗∗
(2.13)
0.22
(0.54)
0.56∗∗
(2.33)
0.93∗∗∗
(3.05)
0.55∗
(1.74)
# observations 147 46 79 69 68
Adjusted R2 0.59 0.58 0.73 0.61 0.64
Note: The t-statistics are shown in parentheses. The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate the
coefficients are significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively.
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Table 3 Economic Growth Does Not Bring Happiness
Year Mean Satisfaction Real Income Critical Level
I III V
Panel A: the U.S.
1982 7.67 22518.19 24284.04 NA NA
1990 7.75 28467.86 24621.31 NA NA
1995 7.68 29910.29 24688.02 NA NA
1999 7.65 33717.43 24729.09 25816.65 24763.60
Panel B: Japan
1981 6.59 24176.56 21652.87 NA NA
1990 6.53 33438.54 21865.49 NA NA
1995 6.72 35332.73 22958.70 NA NA
2000 6.48 37459.16 22886.39 24790.58 21261.54
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Table 4 Economic Growth Does Bring Happiness
Year Mean Satisfaction Real Income Critical Level
I III V
Panel A: Ireland
1981 7.82 9915.67 24239.53 NA NA
1990 7.88 13444.14 24778.52 NA NA
1999 8.17 22952.64 NA 26773.26 25402.69
Panel B: Netherlands
1981 7.70 15564.10 24332.80 NA NA
1990 7.76 18498.68 23940.34 NA NA
1999 7.88 22669.39 NA 26525.55 25676.55
Panel C: Puerto Rico
1995 7.70 11502.26 23646.51 NA NA
2001 7.88 13394.87 24013.54 25563.74 22895.78
34
Table 5 Happiness-Income Elasticity
Income(2000 USD) 1, 000 2, 000 3, 000 5, 000 10, 000
Happiness-income Elasticity 0.1035 0.0983 0.0935 0.0840 0.0612
Income(2000 USD) 15, 000 23, 405 25, 000 30, 000 40, 000
Happiness-income Elasticity 0.0386 0.0000 −0.0075 −0.0313 −0.0812
Note: Here the report is based on regression V with n˜ = 3.10, αˆ = 0.11, and βˆ = 3.85e-5.
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